时间：2022年5月11日（星期三）15:30-16:30
地点：腾讯会议：300-922-928
主题：家族企业与其环境绩效（Family firms and environmental performance ）
主讲人：俞炳俊（YU BYUNGJUN）新利体育（中国）责任有限公司
简介：YU BYUNGJUN（俞炳俊），工商管理系讲师，韩国籍，主要研究领域包括家族企业、企业社会责任、公司治理等。本科就读于韩国培才大学，获学士学位；2011-2020在上海交通大学获硕士、博士学位。在 Corporate Social Responsibility and Environmental Management, Business Strategy And Environment, IEEE Transaction on Engineering Management, and Journal of Cleaner Production等国际期刊发表论文。
摘要：本文关注家族企业的不同治理模式如何影响企业环境绩效。家族经理人作为家族代言人把家族管理理念传播至家族企业的管理实践中，且具有更大的动机推进绿色战略。既有文献表明家族经理人通过绿色战略来维持和提升他们的社会情感财富，如社会地位、 企业声誉和家族形象等。根据代理理论，家族经理人有效监督职业经理人是否推动绿色战略，但家族经理人有时会攫取非家族利益相关者的权益，如少数股东、供应者、员工等。职业经理人可以弥补家族经理人缺少的专业知识、管理技术和经验，但当职业经理人过度追求个人权益时就会导致委托代理冲突。对家族企业而言，建立有效的内部公司治理机制是推动绿色战略的关键。为了研究不同治理模式对家族企业的环境绩效影响，本研究根据董事长和总经理是否为家族成员，将家族企业划分为四个类型的治理模式进行分析：(1) FC（实际控制人是家族或自然人，且具有职业经理人为董事长和总经理的家族企业）; (2) FOC（具有职业经理人为董事长和家族总经理的家族企业）; (3) FSC（具有家族董事长和职业经理人为总经理的家族企业）; (4) FOSC（具有家族董事长和家族总经理的家族企业）。结果显示 FSC 既可有效控制代理成本又可有效配置人力资源，因而在四个治理模式中最有利于提高企业环境绩效。
Family firms bear two types of agency costs, including type I and type II agency problems, in corporate environmental practices: (1) Outside executives at family firms hesitate to engage in environmental strategies, which can lead to drops in profits; (2) Controlling families employ opportunistically environmental management to achieve their interests. We argue that a primary cause for the agency problems lies on ineffective internal corporate governance at family firms, which can cause loss of managerial (or power) balance between outside executives and family executives. Our findings show that family firms with ownership and strategic control (FSC), which family executives and outside executives monitor and constrain each other, can achieve the highest environmental performance. Moreover, external controls, including product market competition and provincial environmental regulations, substitute effective internal control of FSC. The environmental performance premium of FSC is more prevalent when the production market competition is lower. Family firms with ownership, operational, and strategic control (FOSC) can achieve higher environmental performance within a province with more stringent environmental regulations.
